Virginia Legal Issues
A Rogue by Any Other Name is Still a Rogue
Gratuitous
Lawyer Joke
A man was forced to take a day off from work to appear for a traffic summons. He grew increasingly restless as he waited hour after endless hour for his case to be heard.
When he was called late in the afternoon, he stood before the judge, only to hear that court would be adjourned and he would have to return the next day.
"What for?" he snapped at the judge.
His honor, equally irked by a tedious day, roared, "Twenty dollars contempt of court. That's why!"
Then, noticing the man checking his wallet, the judge relented. "That's all right. You don't have to pay now."
The young man replied, "I'm just seeing if I have enough for two more words.”
Sharon M. Newman was driving her car on June 17, 2000 when a truck owned by Hastings Village, Inc. struck her car and caused her injury. The driver of the truck identified himself to the police officer at the scene as Kareem A. Brooks. So, when Ms. Newman filed a lawsuit, she named Kareem A. Brooks and Hastings Village as defendants. Both defendants filed a Grounds of Defense.
However, Hastings Village did not employ anyone named Kareem A. Brooks. The company discovered that its employee William A. Walker was driving the truck at that time and had given the police officer Mr. Brooks’ name. After Ms. Newman soon learned that Mr. Walker had stolen Kareem A. Brooks’ identification and allegedly had taken the truck without permission, she filed an amended motion for judgment against William A. Walker and Hastings Village in October 2003.
After attempting unsuccessfully to serve William A. Walker with the Amended Motion for Judgment, Ms. Newman discovered that William A. Walker’s real name was Leonard Walker, Jr. On February 26, 2004, the court allowed Ms. Newman to change the name of the defendant driver from William A. Walker to Leonard Walker, Jr.
Now almost four years past the time of the wreck, Ms. Newman’s uninsured motorist carrier sought to dismiss the suit under the two-year statute of limitations under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Ms. Newman claimed that the limitastions period was tolled under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(D) because Leonard Walker, Jr. had falsely and fraudulently identified himself to the police and to the plaintiff.
Leonard Walker, Jr. claimed that he did not conceal Ms. Newman’s cause of action but rather only concealed his own identity, so the tolling provision of § 8.01-229(D) did not apply. Mr. Walker contended that his concealment of his identity was like that of the defendant in Grimes v. Suzukawa, 262 Va. 330, 551 S.E.2d 644 (2001), where the defendant wore a mask when he sexually assaulted the plaintiff.
The Virginia Supreme Court in Newman v. Walker, 270 Va. 291, 618 S.E.2d 336 (2005), rejected this defense and distinguished Grimes by stating that Mr. Walker had affirmatively misrepresented his identity to the police, while the attacker in Grimes had never made any such misrepresentation but had merely concealed his identity with a mask. Mr. Walker’s actions were thus sufficiently fraudulent to toll the statute of limitations.
The court did not offer an opinion in the event that Mr. Walker had been wearing a mask when he was driving. So does that mean Batman can drive like a maniac without worry of civil liability?
Is the One with the Black and White Stripes All That You Have in My Size?
A criminal defendant by the gorgeous name of Paradice Carnell Jackson, II (does that first name mean two dice or a sublime locale?) was arrested for statutory burglary and breaking and entering. When Mr. Jackson sat in jail awaiting trial, the sheriff misplaced his civilian clothes. The staff told him that it was still looking for his clothes and that upon his “release or transfer” he would be compensated for their loss if they were still missing.
Mr. Jackson discussed this conundrum with his court-appointed counsel and advised his counsel to contact Mr. Jackson’s mother to get some new clothes for his trial. The attorney attempted to contact the mother several times but never received a response.
Mr. Jackson was ultimately tried on the two charges, and he attended his trial wearing his jail-issued jump suit. The record did not disclose whether the jumpsuit was of the orange, trash collector line or of the simple horizontal, black and white stripes style, which would look smashing with a ball and chain as an accessory. At trial, the defense attorney did not object to Mr. Jackson’s sartorial dilemma, and Mr. Jackson was convicted.
On appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus, the Virginia Supreme Court in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 269, 619 S.E.2d 92 (2005), stated that it had been decided that a defendant could not be compelled to stand trial before a jury while wearing clearly identifiable jail clothing. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). However, the key issue was whether Mr. Jackson had waived his objection because his defense counsel had never objected at trial to the defendant’s unfashionable clothing.
The court held that, while a number of cases had ruled the objection is waived if not timely made at trial, the defense counsel in this case had failed to render effective assistance in Mr. Jackson’s defense. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Mr. Jackson had shown that the defense counsel’s failure to object had been unreasonable and that this defect in representation had prejudiced Mr. Jackson’s defense. So, the court granted Mr. Jackson’s habeas petition and remanded the case for a new trial. A trial where Mr. Jackson will most likely avoid bright colors or bold stripes in choosing his wardrobe.