School Art Teacher Packs Heat; Hey, If She Wants to Do Paper Mache, Do It!

In Esteban v. Commonwealth, No. 022524, 2003 WL 22462176 (Va., Oct. 31, 2003), the Virginia Supreme Court held that Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.1(B), which bars the possession of a firearm on schoo l grounds, does not require proof of criminal intent and, instead, is a statute of strict criminal liability.

In Esteban, an art teacher for the Prince William County Schools, placed a handgun in a zippered canvas bag to accompany her on a shopping trip on a Saturday. That Monday, the art teacher, who sometimes used the bag to carry small art tools, took the bag to school without realizing that the gun was still in the bag. A fellow teacher found the bag and its contents and reported it. The art teacher explained that she usually did not carry the bag and did not remember that the loaded .38 caliber revolver was inside. She maintained that there was nothing about the bag that indicated to her the pistol was inside.

The art teacher sought an instruction at trial that under the statute the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant "knew she possessed the firearm" while on school property. The trial court refused the instruction, and the art teacher claimed on appeal that the trial court had ignored the common law requirement that a defendant have the requisite mens rea, or intent, to commit the crime.

The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that § 18.2-308.1(B) was a statutory offense and that the General Assembly had the authority to dispense with the mens rea requirement in enacting the statute. The court noted that there was no constitutional requirement that an offense contain a mens rea or scienter element. Thus, statutes that do not mention criminal intent make the guilty act alone sufficient to constitute the crime.

The court found that the General Assembly's intention was to assure a safe school environment. The legislature manifestly recognized that the presence of a loaded revolver on school property was an unacceptable danger and the fact that a person innocently brings a loaded gun on school grounds does not diminish that danger. The court held that to req uire strict proof of a criminal intent would defeat the statutory purpose of § 18.2-308.1(B) and that the trial court had not erred in refusing the instruction.

Why Can't A Used Car Salesman Defraud Me?

In Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., No. 022983, 2003 WL 22462311 (Va., Oct. 31, 2003), Gerald Wilkins bought a 1998 BMW from Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc. based on Peninsula's representation that the car was new, even though the odometer had recorded 972 miles. The car had actually been previously titled and was, in fact, a used car. Wilkins sued Peninsula under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-196, et seq., and for common law fraud.

The jury returned a verdict awarding Wilkins $12,000 treble damages under the Act and a verdict awarding $1,862 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for his fraud claim. The trial court later awarded Wilkins $34,183 in attorney's fees and costs. The trial court granted a motion requiring Wilkins to elect between the two verdicts, stating that Wilkins had advanced two alternative theories of recovery based on a single transaction or occurrence and had received a double recovery.

Wilkins conceded that receiving $12,000 in treble damages and $100,000 in punitive damages would constitute a doble recovery of $8,000. Wilkins also conceded that receiving $1,862 in damages under his fraud claim while receiving $4,000 in actual damages under the Act would cause a windfall. Wilkins, though, contended that there should be no election between the remainder of the verdicts.

In resolving this issue on appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court stated that one must consider the nature of the claims involved, the duties imposed, and the injury sustained. It then compared Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC, Inc., 256 V a. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998), and Moore v. Virginia International Terminals, 254 Va. 46, 486 S.E.2d 528 (1997), two cases where duplicative damages were at issue. In Advanced, the court had held that a recovery on a business conspiracy claim required different proof and did not relate to the plaintiff's employment-related claims. In Moore, though, the court had held that the plaintiff must elect between relief under the federal Longshore Act and the state worker's compensation laws.

Ultimately, the court held that Wilkins' claims under the Act and his common law fraud claim were not irreconcilable causes of action requiring election. Instead, the case involved causes of actions with different elements of proof that happened to have potentially duplicative damage awards. In such an instance, all the trial court is required to do is to supervise the damage awards to avoid double recovery.